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I.

INTRODUCTION

In its 1964 landmark decision New York Times v. Sullivan,' the Supreme Court
of the United States held the First Amendment requires public officials to prove
"actual malice" before recovering damages for harm to their reputation in a statelaw defamation suit.' Before that decision, the Supreme Court had not recognized
a true interrelation between the common law tort of defamation and First
Amendment protection of free speech.3 Defamation, in almost all cases, was a strict
liability tort, requiring that a plaintiff prove the defendant published to a third party
a defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff.4
This Note analyzes the South Carolina Supreme Court's recent misguided
treatment of the actual malice doctrine in Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle.' Part II
will discusses the development of the actual malice standard introduced in Sullivan.
Parts III through V address the legal and practical ramifications of the holding and
reasoning in Anderson. Finally, Part VI addresses the prophesy of confusion
articulated by the Sullivan concurrences and how Anderson has brought the
prophesy to fulfillment in South Carolina defamation jurisprudence.
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR DEFAMATORY PUBLICATIONS: SULLIVAN
AND ITS PROGENY

Prior to Sullivan, after a plaintiff established the prima facie elements of
defamation, courts presumed both the alleged defamatory statement's falsity and
the resulting harm.6 Thus, common law defamation precedent required a defendant
to rebut the presumption of falsity-to assert the affirmative defense of truth-as
one possible means of escaping liability.7 Further, the strict liability nature of preSullivan defamation actions precluded a defendant from offering evidence
regarding his fault; as a strict liability tort, fault was not part of the defamation
calculus.8

1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 279-80.
3. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 113, at 805 (5th
ed. 1984).
4. See id. at 804.
5. 365 S.C. 589, 619 S.E.2d 428 (2005). South Carolina has stated the elements of the actual
malice doctrine in a fashion similar to Sullivan, but because the common law elements of the tort are
not at issue in Anderson, they are not stated separately.
6. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 804.
7. Id.
8. See id. (discussing the way courts used privileges, instead of a fault-based calculus, to protect
the free flow of ideas).
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With Sullivan, however, the United States Supreme Court fundamentally

altered state defamation law, particularly with regard to defamation actions
involving public official plaintiffs who are public officials.9

In Sullivan,

Montgomery, Alabama's Commissioner of Public Affairs, L.B. Sullivan, filed a
defamation action against the New York Times for allegedly defamatory statements10
made in an advertisement printed in the Times titled "Heed Their Rising Voices."
The advertisement, addressing the civil rights struggles of African Americans in
segregation-era Alabama, singled out state law enforcement officials for the alleged
"wave of terror" they had perpetrated."1 According to the advertisement, this wave
of terror was perpetrated by the actions of police officers surrounding the Alabama
State College campus after students engaged in a peaceful protest-specifically,
efforts by authorities to padlock the school cafeteria, 2 to starve the protestors, and
the repeated harassment of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., his family, and his
supporters, who were prominent actors in the Alabama civil rights movement. 3
Included in the advertisement copy was a list of sixty-four public figures who had
supposedly endorsed the advertisement, which was purchased by a group referring
to itself as the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for
14
Freedom in the South."'
Sullivan, whose responsibilities included oversight of police officers and other
actors implicated in the wave of terror outlined in the advertisement, 15 took
exception to several of the advertisement's factual assertions, which later proved

9. Id. at 804-05. The United States Supreme Court extended the constitutional protections
afforded to public official defendants in defamation actions to all public figures. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989) (rejecting the so-called "professional
standards rule" for public figures espoused in Curtis Publishing, instead opting to apply the actual
malice standard for public officials and public figures alike); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
155 (1967) (plurality opinion) (holding that public figures must make a "showing of highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers"). For the purposes of this Note, the author
does not distinguish between public officials and public figures, unless otherwise noted. However, the
South Carolina Supreme Court specifically referred to Anderson's concession that he is a "public
official" for the purposes of its actual malice inquiry. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. at 595,
619 S.E.2d at 431.
10. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964). The advertisement in question was
not a traditional commercial advertisement. Rather, it was an editorial advertisement ("advertorial"),
a political commentary that was purchased by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the
Struggle for Freedom in the South. Id. at 257, 260. Such editorial advertisements were a potentially
effective tool for a class of people who largely had no voice in the mainstream media or society at large.
11. Id. at 256-57.
12. Even if true, the implication in the advertisement that students would have actually starved
as a result of police conduct was dubious.
13. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 257-58.
14. Id. at 257. Many of the supposed endorsers of the advertisement's content claimed to have
had no knowledge of the advertisement at the time of its publication. Id. at 260. Apparently, the
advertisement purchasers had taken liberties with their inclusion of names of parties who had offered
general support of the civil rights cause but who had not specifically sanctioned the material in the
advertisement. Id. at 257, 260-61.
15. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
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to be false. 16 Sullivan contended the false and defamatory accusations of wrongful
action by the police implied that he had participated in the wrongdoing and thereby
injured his reputation. 17A jury awarded Sullivan $500,000 in damages-a verdict
that the Alabama Supreme Court upheld on appeal.' 8 In upholding the verdict, the
Alabama Supreme Court rejected the New York Times's argument that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments protected the publication of the advertisement, stating:
"The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not protect libelous
publications. The Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action and not
private action."' 9
The Times appealed to the United States Supreme Court.2 ° The Times once
again asserted that the First and Fourteenth Amendments provided a constitutional
safeguard against defamation liability when a defendant publishes statements
regarding a public official's discharge of his or her official responsibilities.2' The
Court was sympathetic to the argument.
The Court began its analysis by rejecting Sullivan's contention that the First
Amendment offers no protection for libelous statements. Justice Brennan, who
delivered the opinion for the Court,22 wrote:
Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of
the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various
other formulae for the repression of expression that have been
challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity
from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards
that satisfy the First Amendment.23
The Court observed that cases like Sullivan that deal squarely with critically
important issues in an ongoing national political debate, "would seem clearly to
qualify for.., constitutional protection. The question is whether it forfeits that
protection by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged
defamation of respondent."24
First, addressing the issue of falsity, the Court observed "[]that erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate, and.. . it must be protected if the freedoms

16. Specifically, the police at no time surrounded the Alabama State campus, the dining hall had
never been padlocked, the nature of the student protest had been mischaracterized, and the
advertisement overstated the extent to which Martin Luther King had been harassed. Id. at 258-59.
Also, many of the alleged advertisement's signatories disclaimed knowledge and approval of its
publication.See supra note 14.
17. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 258-60.
18. Id. at 256.
19. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 40 (Ala. 1962) (citations omitted).
20. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264.
21. Id. at 264.
22. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
23. Id. at 269 (footnotes omitted).
24. Id. at 271.
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of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need... to survive.'25
Next, addressing defamatory statements regarding public officials, the Court stated
that "[i]njury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech
that would otherwise be free than does factual error.

2

6

Therefore, the Court

concluded, "Ifneither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the
constitutional shield from criticism
of official conduct, the combination ofthe two
' 27
elements is no less inadequate.
Much of the Sullivan Court's analysis was based on earlier philosophical

commentary regarding the Sedition Act,28 which provided criminal libel penalties
for those who criticized government officials. 29 In likening the Alabama court's
imposition of ajudgment against the Times to sanctions under the Sedition Act, the

Court stated that "[w]hat a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of
a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel."3 The
imposition of a half-million dollar judgment against the Times, according to the
Court, amounted to a far greater penalty to the newspaper than a criminal
sanction. 3

Having determined that the First and Fourteenth Amendments offered potential
safeguards in a libel action, the Court then turned to establishing the extent to which

the protections applied. 2 First, in addressing whether the availability of an
affirmative truth defense was a sufficient protection for a public official defamation
defendant, the Court noted:

Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be
deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to
be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether
it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.

They [will] tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of
the unlawful zone.

33

25. Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
28. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-77 (1964).
29. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801). The Court's commentary focused on
the inherent injustice embodied in the acts, concluding that "[a]lthough the Sedition Act was never
tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history." Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 276 (footnote omitted).
30. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277. The Court's treatment of Sullivan as a historical analogue to the
Sedition Acts underscores the Court's broader philosophy that, absent First Amendment protection, state
libel laws could serve as a sharp sword against open political debate, especially when wielded against
the disenfranchised. As Justice Goldberg wrote in his concurrence, "if newspapers, publishing
advertisements dealing with public issues, thereby risk liability, there can also be little doubt that the
ability of minority groups to secure publication of their views on public affairs and to seek support for
their causes will be greatly diminished." Id. at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring in result).
31. Seeid. at 277.
32. Id. at 279.
33. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 526 (1958)).
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In making this statement, the Court effectively held that defendants in public official
defamation cases defendants no longer bear the burden of proving their statements
were true (i.e., asserting truth as an affirmative defense). Rather, the plaintiff in such
actions is required to adduce evidence that the alleged defamatory statement was
false as part of his or her prima facie case. To justify this burden shifting, the Court
noted that false statements themselves can add to the public discourse.34
In shaping the new constitutional doctrine it had wrought, the Court then
addressed the appropriate fault standard for public official defamation actions.
Rejecting the common law theory of liability without fault, the Court stated:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with "actualmalice "-thatis,
with knowledge that it was3 false or with reckless disregardof
whether it was false or not.
The Court's formulation of the public official plaintiffs evidentiary burden was
crucial to the application of the actual malice rule. In determining that Sullivan had
not met this burden, the Court wrote the plaintiff's evidence "lack[ed] the convincing
clarity which the constitutional standard demand[ed]. 36 For evidence of actual
malice to reach convincing clarity, the "state of mind required for actual malice
would have to be brought home to the persons ... having responsibility for the
publication. ' 37 This statement by the Court provides a crucial element of the actual
malice doctrine, especially for claims involving reckless disregard. The language
signals the Court's adoption of a subjective test for examining a defendant's state of
mind.
Sullivan and its progeny have mandated that a public official plaintiff must show
clearly and convincingly that, in the defendant's own mind, the defendant either
knew the published statement was false or published it with "reckless disregard."

34. Id. at 279 n.9.

35. Id. at 279-80 (emphasis added). The Court stated that the ultimate justification for such a rule
was that "'occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although
at times such injury may be great."' Id. at 281 (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 286 (Kan.
1908)).
36. Id. at 285-86. In the Court's subsequent defamation decisions, the "convincing clarity"
language took a more definite shape, becoming known as the "clear and convincing" standard. See, e.g.,
Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659 (1989) (noting the requirement of
clear and convincing evidence to prove a statement was made with actual malice); Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984) (noting that the Constitution bars any
determination of actual malice that is not supported by clear and convincing evidence). The South
Carolina Supreme Court has characterized the clear and convincing standard as "' intermediate, more
than a mere preponderance but less than is required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt."' Peeler v.
Spartan Radiocasting, Inc., 324 S.C. 261, 265 n.4, 478 S.E.2d 282,284 n.4 (1996) (quoting Middleton
v. Johnston, 273 S.E.2d 800, 803 (Va. 1981)).
37. Id. at 287.
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The reckless disregard element of actual malice was an important issue in Garrison
v. Louisiana,3 decided the Term after Sullivan. In Garrison,the Court characterized

reckless disregard as "those
false statements made with [a] high degree of awareness
39
of their probable falsity.

The subjective state of mind standard adopted in Sullivan becomes crucially
important in light of Garrison'sholding. Had the Court mandated an objective
assessment of the defendants' states of mind, a public official plaintiff would have
been allowed to prove actual malice by presenting evidence that a reasonable person
in the defendant's situation would have possessed the requisite knowledge of falsity
or a "high degree of awareness of. . . probable falsity., 40 Instead, the subjective
standard particularizes the actual malice inquiry to a defendant's own state of mind,
thereby requiring a public official plaintiff to prove with convincing clarity that the
defendant in fact possessed such awareness.
Although Sullivan represented a significant victory for First Amendment
protection of free speech and press, Sullivan's concurring Justices articulated a
number of misgivings regarding the Court's actual malice analysis. Justice Goldberg
warned that [i]f the constitutional standard is to be shaped by a concept of malice,
the speaker takes the risk not only that the jury will inaccurately determine his state
of mind but also that the jury will fail properly to apply the constitutional standard
set by the elusive concept of malice. 4
Forty years later, the South Carolina Supreme Court transformed Justice
Goldberg's words from a warning to a prophesy. Anderson turned on Sullivan's
reckless disregard inquiry, 42 but the South Carolina Supreme Court's analysis
confused the doctrine through misapplication of both settled procedural and
substantive defamation law. The problems exhibited in Anderson are particularly
unfortunate given the checkered history of South Carolina defamation jurisprudence,
parts of which Chief Justice Toal has characterized as "mind-numbingly
incoherent."43 Anderson did little to cure this malady.

38. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
39. Id. at 74.
40. Id.
41. N.Y. Times Co. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 302 n.4 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
42. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589, 594-95, 619 S.E.2d 428, 431 (2005).
43. Holtzscheiterv. Thomson Newspapers, Inc. (Holtzscheiterl),332 S.C. 502,516, 506 S.E.2d
497,505 (1998) (Toal, J., concurring). In HoltzscheiterII, the South Carolina Supreme Court attempted
to clarify a mass of uncertainty created by its earlier defamation jurisprudence. This 1998 opinion
marked the second time in five years that this case had come before the court. The court stated that
earlier, in Holtzscheiter v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc. (Holtzscheiter1), 306 S.C. 297,411 S.E.2d 664
(1992), the court caused "error, or at least ... hopeless confusion." HoltzscheiterII, 332 S.C. at 516, 506
S.E.2d at 505 (Toal, J., concurring).
Holtzscheiter H took steps recognizing and correcting the problems the court had created in
HoltzscheiterL Specifically, HoltzscheiterIladdressedthe conceptual differences between defamation
per se and defamation per quod and clarified the fault standards in private plaintiff versus media
defendant defamation actions and clarified the fault standards for awarding punitive damages. See id.
at 509-13, 506 S.E.2d at 501-03 (plurality opinion).
Although the court in HoltzscheiterII did not significantly address the doctrine of actual malice
in public figure defamation actions, Justice Toal's concurrence generally lamented the South Carolina
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Because the court's analysis in Anderson focused so heavily on facts
surrounding the conflict between Anderson and the Augusta Chronicle,the next Part
details the facts of Anderson and provides a brief procedural history that will serve
as a background for the South Carolina Supreme Court's analysis and conclusions.
III.

ANDERSON: THE REBIRTH OF CONFUSION IN SOUTH CAROLINA DEFAMATION
JURISPRUDENCE

The South Carolina Supreme Court's synthesis of public official defamation
precedent took a confusing and potentially troubling turn in Anderson. The case
involved interactions between the Augusta Chronicleand Tom Anderson, a two-time
candidate for the South Carolina House of Representatives." Chad Bray, a reporter
for the Chronicle, conducted two telephone interviews with Anderson in 1997,
addressing Anderson's previous unsuccessful 1996 House campaign and his
upcoming campaign for the state legislature by special election later that year. 45
Subsequent to the two telephone interviews with Anderson, Bray wrote two
articles published in the Chronicle in April 1997 and June 1997 which stated
Anderson told Bray that Anderson had been contracted by the National Guard during
two hurricanes but felt cheated because the call-up occurred during the later stages
of the campaign.46 In reality, Anderson had gone to work in North Carolina as a
claims adjuster
for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), assisting hurricane
47
victims.
In September of 1997, the Chronicle's Aiken, South Carolina bureau chief
called Anderson and asked the candidate to respond to charges leveled by the
Executive Director of the South Carolina Republican Party that Anderson had lied
about his National Guard service. 48 The Chronicle reporter asked Anderson if he
planned to withdraw from his second House campaign because he had been proven
a liar.49 Anderson denied having ever stated that he served in the Guard, insisting
that Bray had misunderstood his statement.5" Anderson later testified that during this
conversation he reiterated to the bureau chief that he had been called away while
working for the NFIP.5 1

Supreme Court's struggles to reconcile the state common law of defamation with constitutional
principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 516-17,506 S.E.2d at 505. Justice Toal
admitted that "this Court's opinions have not completely taken into consideration the impact of
decisions by the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 517, 506 S.E.2d at 505.
44. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589, 591-92, 619 S.E.2d 428, 428-29 (2005).
45. See Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 355 S.C. 461, 466-67, 585 S.E.2d 506, 509 (Ct. App.
2003). Specifically, Anderson testified at trial that only the first conversation referenced his 1996
campaign and his absence just prior to the election. Id. at 467, 585 S.E.2d at 509.
46. Anderson, 365 S.C. at 592, 619 S.E.2d at 429.
47. Anderson, 355 S.C. at 467, 585 S.E.2d at 509.
48. Id. at 467-68, 585 S.E.2d at 509.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 467-68, 585 S.E.2d at 509-10.
51. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 355 S.C. 461,467, 585, S.E.2d 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2003).
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Shortly after conducting this interview with Anderson, the Chroniclepublished
a story, written by John Boyette, regarding the Republican Party's accusations,
entitled, "GOP Wants Anderson Out of House Race: Clearwater Democratic
Candidate is Accused of Lying About His National Guard Service."52 The story
noted that the Chronicle had originally reported Anderson's alleged statement of
Guard service in June of that year and stated that "Mr. Anderson, however, denied
53
...that he ever told The Chronicle that he had served in the National Guard.,
In response to the article, Anderson sought to inform the Chroniclethat he had
worked as a flood appraiser instead of in the National Guard.54Anderson sent copious
documentation regarding his NFIP employment to the Chronicle, which included
"work certification, phone bills, hotel invoices, bank records, and checks he had
written during the time he did appraisals in North Carolina. 5 5 However, none of the
documentation provided direct contradiction of Bray's recollection of the
conversation.56
Five days after Anderson submitted this documentation, the Chroniclepublished
58
57
an opinion piece by editorial page editor Phil Kent entitled "Let the Liar Run.,
The piece stated that Anderson was a "proven prevaricator" and "a candidate who,
in effect, lie[d] on his resume. 59
Anderson immediately attempted to contact Kent to demand a retraction.6" In a
telephone conversation, a Chronicle employee told Anderson that Kent refused to
talk with him. 61 The employee did, however, invite Anderson to write a letter to the
Chronicleexplaining his position.62 Anderson sent the Chroniclea letter refuting the
charges, which the newspaper printed, in a significantly edited form, along with a
clarification.63
Based on the content of the editorial, Anderson filed a complaint against the
Chronicle, alleging the newspaper's characterization of him as a liar was
defamatory. 6" Anderson alleged that the defamatory statements had been published
with actual malice as defined in Sullivan, which is the requisite standard for
Anderson's conceded status as a public official.65

52. John Boyette, GOP Wants Anderson Out of House Race: ClearwaterDemocraticCandidate
isAccusedofLyingAboutHis National GuardService, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Sept. 18, 1997, at A13.
Prior to the publication of this September 18, 1997 article, Anderson claimed that he was unaware of
the Bray articles' publication, and thus he had made no request for correction or retraction of the
erroneous information. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589,592, 619 S.E.2d 428,429 (2005).
53. Boyette, supra note 52, at A13.
54. Anderson, 365 S.C. at 593, 619 S.E.2d at 430.
55. Id. at 593 n.4, 619 S.E.2d at 430 n.4.
56. Id. at 593, 619 S.E.2d at 430.
57. Id. at 593-94, 619 S.E.2d at 430.
58. Phil Kent, Editorial, Let the LiarRun, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Oct. 1, 1997, at A4.
59. Id.
60. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicles, 355 S.C. 461, 470, 585 S.E.2d 506, 510 (Ct. App. 2003).
61. Id. at 470, 585 S.E.2d at 510-11.
62. Id. at 470, 585 S.E.2d at 511.
63. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589, 594, 619 S.E.2d 428, 430 (2005).
64. Anderson, 355 S.C. at 470, 585 S.E.2d at 511.
65. Id. at 472 n.2, 585 S.E.2d at 512 n.2.
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The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the Chronicle,66 evidently
determining that the plaintiff had not presented clear and convincing evidence from
which a reasonable jury could find liability based on actual malice. 67 The South
Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding the trial record contained
ample evidence of actual malice. 6' The court of appeals stated:
The . . . facts about Anderson, known to The Chronicle before

publication of "Let the liar run," support our conclusion that a
reasonable jury could have found the newspaper had "obvious
reasons to doubt" Bray's recollection of his conversation with
Anderson .... In light of these facts, we believe The Chronicle's
failure to undertake a reasonable investigation into the matter

creates a jury question as to whether it published the editorial with
actual malice.69
Among the facts the court of appeals found supportive of its holding were
Anderson's advanced age,7" his previous discharge from active military service four
decades prior to the controversy at bar, and numerous other factual sources. 7
According to the court of appeals, the Chronicle's editorial board failed to heed

obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of Chad Bray's stories.72
Tying the factual issue of publisher doubt to the publisher's undertaking of
investigations, the court of appeals adopted the Ninth Circuit's view from Masson
v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.," which stated that "'where the publisher undertakes
to investigate the accuracy of a story and learns facts casting doubt on the

information contained therein, it may not ignore those doubts, even though it had no
duty to conduct the investigation in the first place."' 74 Because a Chronicle staff

member had specifically requested documentation from Anderson regarding his

66. Id. at 470, 585 S.E.2d at 511.
67. This point assumes that the trial court applied the correct standard for determining the
propriety of a motion for directed verdict, discussed infra Part IV. The trial court issued a form order
with no findings of fact or conclusions of law. Brief of Respondent at 2, Anderson v. Augusta
Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589, 619 S.E 2d 428 (2005) (No. 98-CP-02-0337).
68. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 355 S.C. 461, 484, 585 S.E.2d 506, 518 (Ct. App. 2003).
69. Id. at 484, 585 S.E.2d at 518. Interestingly, this language indicates the court of appeals'
continued obeisance to the notion that failure to check or to make a "reasonable investigation" is a
possible ground for finding actual malice, even though the Supreme Court of the United States
expressly rejected this basis for liability in Sullivan. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
287-88 (1964) (stating that the Times' failure to check its own files to verify the accuracy of the
advertisement in question could not support a finding of actual malice based on reckless disregard)
70. Anderson was 67 at the time of trial. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589, 597 n.6,
619 S.E.2d 428, 432 n.6 (2005).
71. Id. at 596-98, 619 S.E.2d at 432-33. These sources included articles and editorials from a
rival newspaper in which Anderson discussed his NFIP experience and explained his absence during
Hurricane Fran. Id. at 598, 619 S.E.2d at 432-33.
72. Anderson, 355 S.C. at 480, 585 S.E.2d at 516.
73. 960 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1992).
74. Anderson, 355 S.C. at 480 n.4, 585 S.E.2d at 516 n.4 (quoting Masson, 960 F.2d at 901).
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NFIP employment five days before the publication of "Let the Liar Run," the court
of appeals concluded that the Chronicle had assumed a duty not to ignore the facts
it had learned.7"
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' holding that
the evidence presented by Anderson on the issue of actual malice was sufficient to
allow ajury to consider the Chronicle'sliability.76 The supreme court stated that the
trial record was "replete with circumstantial evidence of bad faith on the part of
Kent. The record also contains reasons to doubt the accuracy of Bray's recount of
the interview with Anderson." ' 7 The court found several items of circumstantial
evidence dispositive. First, Anderson testified that he had told a Chroniclereporter
of his work with the flood insurance program prior to the publication of the alleged
defamatory editorial.78 Second, a Chronicle employee contacted Anderson and
specifically requested documentation of his employment with the NFIP five days
before the editorial ran.79 Third, documentation from various sources, including
Anderson's resume, evidenced his employment with the NFIP. 80 Fourth, Anderson's
resum6 documented his discharge from active duty military service in 1956 (readily
verifiable from public records, according to the court) but made no mention of any
National Guard service. 8' Fifth, Anderson was 67 years old at the time of trial,
making it unlikely that he was currently serving in the National Guard.82 Sixth,
articles appeared in a rival publication that tended to support Anderson's assertion
of reporter Bray's misunderstanding.83 The court held that this "evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable84to Anderson, [was] sufficient to submit the question of
actual malice to a jury.
The Part that follows addresses several procedural and evidentiary problems in
the Supreme Court's analysis that, if remedied, would lead to a contrary conclusion.
IV.

THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT'S STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL AND
EVIDENTIARY RULES FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT PLACES ACTUAL MALICE INTO
THE REALM OF HOLTZSCHEITER-ESQUECONFUSION

The South Carolina Supreme Court, in addressing the amount of evidence
necessary to remandAnderson, stated that "[t]he central issue of this case is whether
any evidence exists tending to prove that Kent recklessly disregarded the truth when
he published the article 'Let the Liar Run.' If such evidence exists, the question of

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id. at 480-87, 585 S.E.2d at 516-20.
Anderson, 365 S.C. at 598, 619 S.E.2d at 433.
Id. at 596, 619 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. at 596-97, 619 S.E.2d at 432.
Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589, 597, 619 S.E.2d 428, 432 (2005).
Id. at 597, 619 S.E.2d at 432-33.
Id. at 597, 619 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. at 597, 619 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. at 598, 619 S.E.2d at 432-33.
Id. at 598, 619 S.E.2d at 433.
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actual malice is a question of fact for a jury.""5 This statement mirrors the general
rule regarding appellate review of directed verdicts in South Carolina: "When
reviewing an order granting a directed verdict,8 6 [a c]ourt must view the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.5
When the issue of actual malice arises in the context of a public figure
defamation action, however, the United States Supreme Court requires the plaintiff
to bear a heavier evidentiary burden. Specifically, the plaintiff in such cases must
prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.87 This standard originates
from the seminal language of Sullivan, in which the Court held that plaintiffs had not
shown actual malice with the "convincing clarity which the constitutional standard
demands ....
,,88

Although the Sullivan appeal originated from the New York Times' challenge to
an Alabama state court jury verdict, 9 a subsequent Supreme Court defamation case,
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,90 articulated the extent to which the clear and

convincing standard applies to appellate review of actions in which ajury verdict has
not been reached.9 1 The South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Anderson failed
to account for this added constitutional requirement.
In Liberty Lobby, the United States Supreme Court held that "the clear-andconvincing standard of proof should be taken into account in ruling on summary
judgment motions [for defamation actions]." 92 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
focused much of its analysis on how the evidentiary burden for preliminary motions
has evolved in American law.93 This evolution began, according to the Court, with
the originally applied "'scintilla of evidence" 94 standard and progressed through the
civil preponderance standard that courts apply to "run-of-the-mill civil case[s]. 95
The Court noted:
"Formerly it was held that if there was what is called a scintilla of
evidence in support of a case the judge was bound to leave it to the
jury, but recent decisions of high authority have established a more
reasonable rule, that in every case, before the evidence is left to the

85. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589, 595, 619 S.E.2d 428, 431 (2005) (emphasis
added).
86. Id. at 594, 619 S.E.2d at 430-31.
87. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,490 (1984) ("[T]he First
Amendment, as interpreted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, precludes recovery ...

unless the

petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent made a false disparaging statement
with 'actual malice."') (citations omitted).
88. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
89. Id. at 256.
90. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). The plaintiff in this case is not the same plaintiff in the action that is the
subject of this Note. See id. at 245; Anderson, 365 S.C. at 591, 619 S.E.2d at 466.
91. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252-53.
92. Id. at 255.
93. Id. at 251-54.
94. Id. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442,448 (1872)).
95. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
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jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether
there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which
a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the
party
96
producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.
Justice White, however, writing for the six-justice Liberty Lobby majority, noted
that public figure defamation cases are far from run-of-the-mill civil cases.
Recognizing the importance of the First Amendment in all phases of a public figure
defamation action, Justice White wrote that "where the First Amendment mandates
a 'clear and convincing' standard, the trial judge in disposing of a directed verdict
motion should consider whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude,
for example,
97
that the plaintiff had shown actual malice with convincing clarity.
In light of the Court's plainly stated conclusion in Liberty Lobby that "a ruling
on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates
the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the
merits," 98 the South Carolina Supreme Court's apparent disregard of this mandate
is perplexing. The court gave no consideration of whether a reasonable jury could
find clear and convincing evidence of the Chronicle'salleged actual malice; neither
the phrase clear and convincing nor the phrase with convincing clarity appear
anywhere in the Anderson opinion. 99 Although it is impossible to determine whether
the court's opinion in Anderson would have changed if it had appropriately
considered Liberty Lobby, public figure defamation defendants in general would fare
better under a clear and convincing standard than under a preponderance standard.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's failure to acknowledge the clear and
convincing standard becomes even more puzzling in light of South Carolina
defamation precedent articulated prior to Anderson. 1° ° For example, Anderson's
"any evidence" language seems to directly contradict the South Carolina's Supreme
Court's prior holding in George v. Fabri.' The Fabricourt, after declaring directed
verdicts and summary judgments to be analytical equivalents," 2 held "the
appropriate standard at the summary judgment phase on the issue of constitutional

96. Id. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1872) (alterations in
original)).
97. Id. at 252. Additionally, the Liberty Lobby majority equated treatment of civil actions to their
criminal counterparts, writing that "this is no different from the consideration of a motion for acquittal
in a criminal case, where the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies and where the trial judge asks
whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
98. Id. at 252.
99. See generally Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589, 619 S.E.2d 428 (2005)
(neglecting to mention the clear and convincing standard).
100. The court broadly stated, "The record in this case is replete with circumstantial evidence of
bad faith on the part of Kent." But this language failed to state the appropriate evidentiary burden in a
public figure defamation case. Id. at 596, 619 S.E.2d at 432.
101. 345 S.C. 440, 548 S.E.2d 868 (2001).
102. See id. at 452, 548 S.E.2d at 874 (stating that "'[a] motion for summary judgment is akin to
a motion for a directed verdict' because 'in each instance, one party must lose as a matter of law'
(quoting Main v. Corley, 281 S.C. 525, 526-27, 316 S.E.2d 406, 407 (1984))).
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actual malice is the clear and convincing standard."'1 3 Interestingly, the Fabricourt
cited Liberty Lobby as the basis for its holding."
The Anderson court's apparent deviation from settled procedural and evidentiary
standards begs the question of why the clear and convincing language is absent from
the opinion. Two conclusions are possible. First, the South Carolina Supreme Court
may have meant exactly what it wrote-creating a significant conflict with settled
federal and South Carolina state precedent. °5 Such a conclusion, because of the
potential constitutional conflict it would create, seems implausible. Second, the court
may not have meant exactly what it wrote and instead intended to leave settled
precedent untouched. 1 6 This conclusion would require future courts to infer that
Anderson left the clear and convincing standard intact for appeals of directed
verdicts, despite the court's failure to acknowledge Liberty Lobby's evidentiary
mandate and the opinion's seemingly contrary "any evidence" language, This
conclusion also seems unlikely because Chief Justice Toal, who wrote the principal
opinion in Anderson, previously articulated the following scathing critique of the
"hopeless confusion" of South Carolina defamation jurisprudence:
[C]ertain areas of South Carolina defamation law.., are mindnumbingly incoherent. Case law in this state presents no clear
analytical system for resolving defamation questions. Because a
clear framework is lacking, the resolution of disputes often turns
on chance, on whatever aspect of defamation law happens to arrest
the parties' or court's attention in that case. As a result, the law
lacks consistency and predictability, and confounds the bench, the
bar, members of the general public, and media personnel who have
to make important decisions based on court precedent. 107

103. Id. at 454, 548 S.E.2d at 875.
104. Id. at 453-54, 548 S.E.2d at 875 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250-56 (1986)).
105. Actually, the supreme court's issue statement in Anderson paralleled Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Liberty Lobby, which argued that Sullivan's constitutional protections required no further
bolstering by unnecessary procedural safeguards. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 268-70 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated that the majority, "apparently moved by concerns for intellectual
tidiness, mistakenly decides that the 'clear and convincing evidence' standard governing finders of fact
in libel cases must be applied by trial courts in deciding a motion for summary judgment in such a
case." Id. at 268. Justice Rehnquist continued, "' [The Court has] have already declined in other contexts
to grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the
constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws."' Id. at 269 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984)).
106. However, the South Carolina Court of Appeals cited Liberty Lobby in its holding. See
Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 355 S.C. 461,490,585 S.E.2d 506,521 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 257). The South Carolina Supreme Court's affirmation of the appellate holding
might signal its acceptance of the entirety of the lower court's analysis. However, the court made no
explicit statement of such blanket acceptance.
107. HoltzscheiterII, 332 S.C. 502, 516-17,506 S.E.2d 497, 505 (1998) (Toal, J., concurring in
result).
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In light of now-Chief Justice Toal's recognition that the court's erratic
defamation analysis has often created significant confusion for lower courts, the
Anderson court should have taken great pains to avoid creating Holtzscheiter-esque
confusion in its consideration of the actual malice standard. However, given this
difficult Hobson's choice between possible, unsettling conclusions, the South
Carolina Supreme Court apparently again embarked down a path of uncertainty in
its defamation jurisprudence.
The supreme court's ruling suggests a desire to give a defamation plaintiff his
day in court, even if doing so might confuse South Carolina defamation
jurisprudence. In Anderson, the court seemingly dulled the edges of its analysis from
the outset by failing to acknowledge the significance of Liberty Lobby in its
procedural and evidentiary discussion.' This error becomes more evident when
examining the Anderson court's substantive and factual analysis. The court either
ignored or refused to consider several crucial legal and factual elements that, if
appropriately considered, might have led to a contrary holding.
In the Part that follows, this Note will address troubling elements of the
substantive legal analysis in Anderson.
V.

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE GETS LESS CLEAR BY THE MOMENT:

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENTIARY BASIS EXISTS TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF ACTUAL
MALICE

The Anderson court's procedural and evidentiary analysis pushes South Carolina
defamation jurisprudence down the path of confusion. But the court's substantive
legal analysis of the appeal in Anderson offers little assurance that the case is merely
a temporary lapse of sound judgment.
Specifically, beyond the unclear procedural and evidentiary analysis, three
analytical problems surface in Anderson. First, the court's analysis does not address
Sullivan's mandate that, for liability to attach, the "state of mind required for actual
malice ...[must] be brought home to the persons in the ... organization having
responsibility for the publication." 0 9 The court noted no evidence, much less clear
and convincing evidence, of reckless disregard on the part of Phil Kent, author of
"Let the Liar Run." Second, the court mistakenly relied on the informant veracity
analysis of St. Amant v. Thompson" 0 to determine that the Chronicle'seditors had
evidence to doubt reporter Chad Bray's account of his conversation with Tom
Anderson."' Third, consistent with Sullivan, the court cited a publisher's failure to
investigate as an insufficient basis for a finding of actual malice," 2 but language
elsewhere in the court's analysis suggested that liability may be found at both

108. Unlike the South Carolina Supreme Court, the South Carolina Court of Appeals relied to
some extent on Liberty Lobby in reaching its conclusions. Anderson, 355 S.C. at 471, 475, 585 S.E.2d
at 511, 513.
109. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964).
110. 390 U.S. 727 (1968). The informant veracity analysis is discussed infra Part V.B.
11l.Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589, 595, 619 S.E.2d 428, 431 (2005).
112. Id. at 596, 619 S.E.2d at 431.
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extremes of the fact-checking spectrum. Under this rubric, actual malice may exist
either in a complete absence of checking in a case where exhaustive checking
occurs.113 This "failure to check" analysis seems bound up in the court's continued
reliance on the professional standards rule from the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,114 which the South Carolina Supreme
Court relied on in reaching its holding in Peelerv. SpartanRadiocasting,Inc."5 This

reliance endures even though the United States Supreme Court rejected the
professional standards test in Harte-HanksCommunications,Inc. v. Connaughton."6
A.

InappropriateApplication of the Sullivan State of Mind Requirement

In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court endorsed a subjective standard for
assessing the defendant's state of mind in publishing defamatory statements
regarding a public official plaintiff."7 The Court refused to impose defamation
liability on the newspaper even though the advertising department staff would have
found factual inaccuracies in the published piece if it had cross referenced the Times'
own files.' The Court determined that "[t]he mere presence of the stories in the files
does not, of course, establish that the Times 'knew' the advertisement was false,
since the state of mind required for actual malice would have to be brought home to
'9
the persons in the Times organizationhaving responsibilityfor the publication.""

The factual situation in Anderson is strikingly similar to Sullivan. In Anderson,
the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the plaintiffs reckless disregard
allegations, stating that "[t]he record in this case is replete with circumstantial
evidence of bad faith on the part of Kent [the writer of the allegedly defamatory
editorial]." 12 The court then offered a laundry list of actions taken by various
members of the Chronicle staff as evidence of bad faith.' 2 ' However, none of the
factual elements cited by the court references Kent; instead, the court referred to the
actions of reporter Chad Bray and Anderson's interactions with John Boyette and
Pat Willis, two other Chroniclestaff members.' 22 Additionally, the court pointed to
his military service
information on Anderson's resum -including
23
record-subsequently provided by Anderson to contradict Bray's initial account.1
The court noted:

113. See id. at 596-97, 619 S.E.2d at 431-32.
114. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
115. 324 S.C. 261, 266, 478 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1996).
116. 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989).
117. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964).
118. Id.
119. Id. (emphasis added). This demonstrates that, although the Times was the defendant ofrecord
for the case, imposition of defamation liability on the Times required actual malice on the part of the
department responsible for the advertisement's publication.
120. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589, 596, 619 S.E.2d 428, 432 (2005).
121. Id. at 596-98, 619 S.E.2d at 432-33; see supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 596-98, 619 S.E.2d at 432-33.
123. Id. at 597, 619 S.E.2d at 432.
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A jury could have concluded The Chronicleshould have realized
Anderson's purported statement was highly questionable,
particularly in light of his advanced age. These facts, known to The
Chronicle before publication of 'Let the liar run,' could lead a
reasonable jury to infer The Chronicle had 'obvious reasons to
doubt' Bray's recollection of his conversation with Anderson.' 24
The court stated three times that the Chronicleshould have realized the questionable
nature of Bray's account because of the information later supplied by Anderson.25
However, the court did not cite evidence that the editorial page editor Kent actually
had knowledge of this information, which is particularly puzzling in light of the fact
that the Chroniclepublished no story containing the information Anderson provided
prior to the publication of the editorial. Kent's editorial was the sole basis upon
which Anderson alleged defamation. 126
Just like staff members of the New York Times, staff members at the Chronicle
worked in different departments and performed discrete job functions. Sullivan
required Anderson to "bring home"' 27 evidence of actual malice to Kent himself as
the writer of the defamatory material. 21 8 Based on this premise, evidence of bad faith
by other Chronicle staff members revealed nothing about Kent's subjective state of
mind unless the plaintiff could prove by clear and convincing evidence that some
link other than common employment existed between Kent and the other staff
members. According to Sullivan, members of an organization may not be presumed
to share knowledge unique to their employment endeavors; 29 had the United States
Supreme Court held differently, the Times would have been subjected to liability for
defamation.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's determination that Kent may have acted
in bad faith is even more troubling in light of an additional degree of separation that
existed between Kent and his staff members that did not exist in Sullivan. In
Sullivan, investigation of Times news files would have unearthed information
conclusively contrary to the alleged defamatory statements in the advertisement.130
Assuming that Kent believed Bray's account, the documentation that Anderson
eventually sent Willis,' 31 or Anderson's resum6 and military record-none of which
Anderson proved were brought to Kent's attention-would only have served to
confirm, not refute, Kent's conclusion that Anderson lied. In failing to recognize
Kent's valid editorial judgment based on his subjective state of mind, the South

124. Id. at 597, 619 S.E.2d at 432 (footnote omitted).
125. Id. at 596-98, 619 S.E.2d at 432-33.
126. See Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589, 593-94, 619 S.E.2d 428, 430 (2005).
127. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964).
128. Although the court referred to Bray as causing incorrect information to be published
regarding Anderson, any presumed bad faith on Bray's part is inconsequential because Anderson only
stated a defamation claim for Kent's editorial. See Anderson, 365 S.C. at 593-94, 619 S.E.2d at 430.
129. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 287.
130. See id.
131. Anderson, 365 S.C. at 593 n.4, 619 S.E.2d at 430 n.4.
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32
an exertion of authority expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court. 1
B.

InappropriateApplication of St. Amant's Informant Veracity Standard

In St. Amant, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that reckless

disregard for the falsity of material may occur if a publisher fails to investigate the
truth of the material when "there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
informant or the accuracy of his reports."' 33 The Anderson court quoted this
language as the foundation of its reckless disregard analysis. 34 Although St.
Amant's time-tested principle is an accurate statement of an important aspect of the

reckless disregard calculus, its application to the facts in Anderson is dubious at best.
In both St. Amant and in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
Connaughton'3 5-the other United States Supreme Court case significantly

employing the informant veracity rule-the informants were third parties who
consciously fed information to the publisher of the defamatory statements. 36 In
neither case were the informants part of the organization from which the plaintiff
sought relief.'37 Apparently, like the court of appeals, the South Carolina Supreme
Court regarded other Chronicle staff members as third-party informants to Kent.
This conclusion does not receive support from any settled precedent.
Assuming that a publication's employees could be treated as third-party
informants, the unique relationship between an employer and employee illustrates
an additional problem with the reporter-as-third-party-informant theory. The St.
Amant standard allows a finding of reckless disregard if a publisher had "obvious

132. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (stating that a Florida
statute that intruded into the editorial function could not survive constitutional scrutiny).
133. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968).
134. Anderson, 365 S.C. at 595, 619 S.E.2d at 431 (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732).
135. 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989).
136. See id. at 660 (stating that a grand jury witness provided information to a publisher of
another party's wrongdoing); St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 728 (identifying a local union official who gave
information to a political candidate that the candidate used to defame a rival).
137. The court of appeals explained away this distinction, stating that Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc. held that reporters may be considered informants for the purposes of the informant
veracity rule. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 355 S.C. 461, 479-80, 585 S.E.2d 506, 516 (Ct. App.
2003) (citing Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 960 F.2d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 1992)). However, the
facts ofAnderson and Masson are hardly parallel. In Masson, the Ninth Circuit (and later the Supreme
Court) addressed the issue ofwhethera reporter's deliberate and admitted alterations of quoted material
could be a sufficient finding of actual malice. Masson, 960 F.2d at 899. The South Carolina Court of
Appeals also cited Speer v. Ottoway Newspapers, Inc. in support of this theory, but again the reference
is unfounded. Anderson, 355 S.C. at 479, 585 S.E.2d at 516 (citing Speer, 828 F.2d 475,477 (8th Cir.
1987)). In Speer, an allegedly defamatory story was written from information given to editors by a
reporter-photographer. Speer, 828 F.2d at 476. In Anderson, Kent and Bray had no discernible
relationship adduced at trial. Anderson, 355 S.C. at 466-70, 585 S.E.2d at 509-11. At any rate, the
Eighth Circuit concluded in Speer that the reporter's actions inferred nothing regarding the editors' state
of mind. Speer, 828 F.2d at 477. The court of appeals in Anderson stated that the editors considered the
reporter an "outside source"; it did not, however, state that the reporter was the legal equivalent to a St.
Amant informant. Anderson, 355 S.C. at 479, 585 S.E.2d at 516.
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8

When an editor faces a choice of whether to believe a candidate for political office
who makes statements favorable to his own candidacy or conflicting reports by his
reporter who is presumably vetted by a hiring process, the Anderson court
effectively held that the editor should believe the political candidate. The court

reached this conclusion even though Anderson made no showing at trial that Kent
was privy to any information beyond Bray's initial reports and the Republican party
allegations. 3 9 Thus, even if Bray was a third-party informant as envisioned by St.
Amant, the evidence in Anderson lacked the obvious reasons to doubt the informant

demanded by the rule. Indeed, demanding editors' institutional distrust of staff
members upon pain of defamation liability would cripple the newsgathering
profession, and the Court in Sullivan warned of this effect. 4 '
C. InappropriateRole ofFailure to Investigate in Anderson
In Anderson, the South Carolina Supreme Court correctly cited the rule from
Sullivan that "failure to investigate, alone, is insufficient to support a finding that a
defendant 'recklessly disregarded' the falsity of a published article."'' Additionally,
the Anderson court, quoting its earlier decision in George v. Fabri,noted that "South

Carolina has also declined to impose rigid investigatory duties on members of the
press... [holding] 'reckless conduct contemplated by the New York Times standard
is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have.., investigated
before publishing. '""" 4

From this point, however, the failure to investigate analysis in Anderson begins
to exhibit inconsistencies with settled constitutional precedent. The Anderson court
stated that "[t]his Court has held that to 'establish recklessness, there must be an
extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by reasonable publishers."" 43
The court's recitation of the professional standards rule from Peeler and Curtis
Publishingfailed to consider the fact that the United States Supreme Court explicitly

138. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732.
139. See generally, Anderson, 365 S.C. at 596-97, 619 S.E.2d at 432 (citing no factors directly
related to Kent's knowledge or state of mind).
140. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964) (stating that "whether or not a
newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those
who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms
cannot survive").
141. Anderson, 365 S.C. at 596, 619 S.E.2d at 431 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 286-88).
142. Anderson v. Augusta Chronicle, 365 S.C. 589, 596, 619 S.E.2d 428, 431 (2005) (quoting
George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 456, 548 S.E.2d 868, 876 (2001)) (alterations in original).
143. Id. at 596, 619 S.E.2d at 431 (quoting Peeler v. Spartan Radiocasting, Inc., 324 S.C. 261,
266, 478 S.E.2d 282, 285 (1996)). This language essentially restates the professional standards rule
articulated in Curtis Publishing, a case that broadened First Amendment protections for defamation
defendants to cases involving public figures. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
Curtis Publishing stated the rule that courts will use to impose liability on a publisher- when there is
evidence of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id.
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rejected the use of the professional standards rule in Harte-Hanks,stating that "there
is no question that public figure libel cases are controlled by the New York Times
standard and not by the professional standards rule, which never commanded a
majority of this Court."'" Further, the professional standards rule never applied to
defamation actions involving public officials,
the term the South Carolina Supreme
145
Court used to characterize Anderson.
The court's citation to Peeler seems incorrect if the court is truly following a
subjective standard. If South Carolina law requires, as the court suggested in
Anderson, that a defendant's actions be measured against a "standard [] of
investigation,' 46 then the court incorrectly adopted an objective test because
standards are norms that serve as a references for judgment. Such a test directly
conflicts with Sullivan and undermines the court's next statement-"Further, this
Court held that the 'reckless conduct contemplated by the New York Times standard
is not measured by whether a reasonablyprudent man would have ...investigated
before publishing."", 147 The court further stated that a plaintiff must show "a
'
subjective awareness of probable falsity."148
A final troubling element exists in Anderson's "failure to investigate" analysis.
The court referenced Anderson's resum6 and his military record, which were "public
and easily verifiable."' 4 9 This statement suggests that the ready availability of
information somehow figures into the defendant's subjective decision to publish-if
information is close by, failure to procure it suggests fault on the part of the
publisher. Once again, this position squarely conflicts with the failure to investigate
language in Sullivan.
VI. CONCLUSIONS: THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OFANDERSONAND AVOIDING A REPEAT

OF HISTORY

Justice Goldberg, concurring in Sullivan, expressed doubt that juries would be
able to adequately assess a defamation defendant's state or mind or to correctly
apply the concept of actual malice in reaching verdicts in defamation actions. 5 0 In
the wake of the Anderson court's apparent procedural and substantive analyses
problems, Justice Goldberg's concerns apply with equal force to judges in
defamation actions. Unlike a jury verdict's discrete application to a single conflict,
however, the Anderson court's treatment of actual malice unfortunately conjures a
specter of liability that will linger over South Carolina defamation jurisprudence.

144. Harte-Hanks Commc'n, Inc. v. Cormaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989).
145. Anderson, 365 S.C. at 594-95, 619 S.E.2d at 431.
146. Harte-Hanks,491 U.S. at 666 (emphasis added).
147. Anderson, 365 S.C. at 596, 619 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting Fabri,345 S.C. at 456, 548 S.E.2d
at 876 (emphasis added)).
148. Id. at 365 S.C. at 596, 619 S.E. 2d at 431-32 (emphasis added).
149. Id.at 597, 619 S.E.2d at 432.
150. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 302 n.4 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring in
result).
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This specter will doggedly pursuejoumalists whenever they interact with public figures.
Indeed, the most damning criticism of Anderson exists in its seeming disregard
for the practical consequences that may arise in the case's aftermath, rather than in
any theoretical legal infirmity the case demonstrates. The court in Anderson
apparently concluded that Phil Kent, writer of "Let the Liar Run," demonstrated
ample bad faith in his failure to consider readily obtainable and verifiable
information that contradicted Anderson's alleged dishonest statements-without any
evidence that Kent actually knew the information existed.1 5' Had Kent examined
this information, the court suggested, he would or should have doubted the veracity
of his informant, the Chronicle's own reporter.' 52 According to the court, such
doubts were significant enough to provide a triable issue of fact for ajury and justify
remand.' 53 Given this analysis, an editor could rarely trust his own reporter over a
political candidate without fear of defamation liability. The South Carolina Supreme
Court in Anderson suggested that an editor remain silent even if he implicitly trusts
his reporter.
A hypothetical example serves to make this point. Assume in an Anderson-like
situation the editor believes a political candidate has lied, basing this belief upon an
obvious conflict between the candidate's alleged statements to his reporter and other
information known to the editor about the candidate. Further research from readily
available sources, such as his publication's own files, reinforces the editor's belief
that the candidate lied and does not contradict the reporter's account of the
interview.
However, the presence of such contrary information, as suggested by the court
in Anderson, will serve as evidence of the editor's bad faith if he prints an editorial
with the accusation of dishonesty, even though the contrary information itself is the
very basis of the accusation. 54
' If the editor publishes the accusatory editorial without
additional checking, the failure to find and consider such readily available
information could serve as evidence of actual malice.' 55
At the other end of the spectrum, if the editor considers the additional
information but still believed the reporter's account, Anderson would again allow a
jury to infer actual malice because the editor should have believed the significant
body of information contrary to the statements the candidate allegedly made to the
reporter. Either approach to fact investigation, according to Anderson, offers
evidence of the editor's bad faith, simply by virtue of the editor's subjective belief
in his reporter's competence.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Anderson v. Augusta Chronicles, 365 S.C. 589, 598, 619 S.E. 2d 428, 433 (2005).
See id. at 596-98, 619 S.E.2d at 432-33.
Id. at 598, 619 S.E.2d at 433.
Id. at 596-98. 619 S.E.2d at 432-33.
Id. at 596-98, 619 S.E.2d at 432-33.
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Such a conclusion might be plausible in cases where the political candidate did
not lie or misstate his qualifications, but assume that the politician did lie. 5 6 Given
the same volume and availability of external facts contrary to the reporter's
assertion, the Anderson court would weigh the reporter's statement against the
external facts and again conclude that the editor's trust in the reporter manifested by
printing the accusation of dishonesty, provided evidence of bad faith upon which
actual malice could be found. This is true even though, in this hypothetical, the
editor was right.
Sullivan's concurring justices foresaw the confusion that the doctrine of actual
malice could create.' 57 They were correct-the outcome of Anderson was inevitably
forged on the day that the Supreme Court penned Sullivan. Perhaps it is time then,
to take heed of the Sullivan prophets, and discard the actual malice doctrine and its
confusion forever. As Justice Black suggested:
In my opinion the Federal Constitution has dealt with this
deadly danger to the press in the only way possible without leaving
the free press open to destruction-by granting the press an
absolute immunityfor criticism ofthe way public officials do their

public duty. Stopgap measures like those the Court adopts are in
my judgment not enough. This record certainly does not indicate
that any different verdict would have been rendered here whatever
the Court had charged the jury about "malice," "truth," "good
motives," "justifiable ends," or any other legal formulas which in
theory would protect the press. Nor does the record indicate that
any of these legalistic words would have caused the courts below
to set aside
or to reduce the half-million-dollar verdict in any
58
amount.
He concluded, "An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public
affairs
' 59
is what I consider to be the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment."'

156. On the court's consideration of the directed verdict, the court was not obliged to believe
Anderson lied, as procedural rules required the court to view facts and inferences in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 594, 619 S.E.2d at 430-31. However, the court focused much of its
analysis on establishing the improbability of Anderson's dishonesty. Id. at 596-98, 619 S.E.2d at
432-33. In this light, a discussion of how the court's holding would apply if Anderson did lie or
misstate his qualifications is appropriate.
157. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
158. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
159, Id.at 297 (emphasis added).
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Ensuring the full promise of the First Amendment by absolutely protecting press
commentary on the actions of public officials would not only give plain application
to the words of the amendment, but would also offer a quiet burial to the confusion
that has plagued and seemingly will continue to plague South Carolina defamation
jurisprudence.
ChristopherS. McDonald
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